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HIPAA: Commercial Interests Win Round Two
Mike Hatcht
I. THE BANK PRIVACY PROVISION OF 1999:
COMMERCIAL INTERESTS WIN ROUND ONE
Caught between the citizens' desire for autonomy and lob-
byists representing commerce, federal policymakers capitulated
to commercial lobbyists for the second time in three years by
adopting HIPAA regulations. A brief review of the first round
might shed light on the dynamics that produced HIPAA.
The first capitulation occurred in the fall of 1999, when
Congress culminated a fifteen-year debate concerning the de-
regulation of banks by passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLB). 1 The debate focused on whether banks and their hold-
ing companies should be permitted to own commercial compa-
nies, such as securities and insurance firms. The affiliation of
these firms had been expressly prohibited by the Glass-Steagall
Act of 19332 and the Bank Holding Act of 1956. 3
As Congress was nearing a final vote on the GLB, the State
of Minnesota filed suit against US Bank National Association
ND (US Bank).4 The State alleged that US Bank violated con-
sumer protection laws by misrepresenting to its customers that
their account information was confidential.5 In fact, the bank
made over twenty pieces of information about each depositor
t Attorney General of Minnesota. Special thanks to the following staff
of the Minnesota Attorney General's Office for their assistance on this Article:
Assistant Attorney General Mark Ireland, Assistant Attorney General Erik
Lindseth, Assistant Attorney General Margaret Chutich, Assistant Attorney
General Jane Prine, and Administrative Assistant Renee Hansmeier.
1. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
2. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to sections
16, 20, 21 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & Supp. II
1997), 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377-378 (1994).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
4. Hatch v. US Bank Natl Ass'n ND, No. 99-872 (D. Minn. filed June 8,
1999).
5. Id.
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available to telemarketers, including credit card numbers, ac-
count numbers, high balance, low balance, and customer profile
designation.6 The State alleged that the telemarketers then
used this information to defraud customers by making unau-
thorized charges against their accounts.7 The State's lawsuit
against US Bank drew national attention to the issue of privacy
when it came to light that most large banks in the United
States also routinely sold their customers' personal financial
information.8
Within days of the lawsuit's filing, bank lobbyists con-
verged on Congress, which quickly responded by amending
GLB to include a "bank privacy" provision.9 Did this provision
recognize an individual's right to financial privacy? Hardly.
The bank privacy provision permits banks to disclose per-
sonal financial data without depositor authorization to compa-
nies they own,1 ° and to unrelated third parties if the purpose is
to sell "financial products."1' The provision conveniently does
not define "financial products," which potentially gives even
broader license for the bank to disclose data.
The bank privacy provision imposes one minimal obligation
on financial institutions. Before distributing depositor data to
other companies for non-financial products, banks must notify
the depositor.12 Banks do this by sending fine-print notices in
bank statements, which are rarely read. 13 Even if the depositor
6. Id.
7. Hatch v. MemberWorks, Inc., No. MC99-010056 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed
Apr. 17, 2000).
8. Henry Gilgoff, Private Matters: More Banks Now Selling Personal
Consumer Data, NEWSDAY, July 25, 1999, 1999 WL 8182389 ("[T]he deals are
widespread among the country's biggest banks, [Comptroller of the Currency]
Hawke said in a recent interview."). A U.S. Bancorp spokesperson stated that
the "cooperative marketing programs are common practices." Id.; see also Dee
DePass, U.S. Bank Kills Marketing Deals, STAR TRMB., June 11, 1999, at D1
(identifying Citibank's moratorium on sharing information with telemar-
keters); Marcy Gordon, Chase Privacy Pact May Prompt Trend, AP ONLINE,
Jan. 28, 2000, 2000 WL 9751992 (stating that as many as twenty-two million
consumers nationwide have been affected by Chase Manhattan's past decision
to disclose personal customer information).
9. Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bank Bill Privacy Provision Approved, WASH.
POST, June 11, 1999, at El.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2000).
11. Id. § 6802(b)(2).
12. See id. § 6802(a) (citing § 6803(a)).
13. WA. Lee, Opt-Out Notices Give No One a Thrill, AM. BANKER, July
10, 2001, at 1 ('Many consumers have received their privacy notices, but be-
cause they are stuffed in the envelope with other materials and because
1482 [Vol.86:1481
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actually reads it, the fine print does not meaningfully explain
what the financial institution intends to do with the depositor's
sensitive financial information.14 United States Senator Rich-
ard Shelby summarized GLB's privacy provisions as simply a
"sham."15
Far from providing consumers with necessary protection,
GLB's bank privacy provision legitimizes bank disclosure of de-
positor information. It is a legislative oxymoron.
In their article, Professors Lawrence Gostin and James
Hodge glowingly describe HIPAA as a national privacy safe-
guard that protects the privacy of identifiable health informa-
tion.16 A better description of HIPAA would be that it is a regu-
latory oxymoron. Rather than providing consumers with
necessary protection, HIPAA actually sanctions disclosure of
patients' sensitive health information. The only difference be-
tween HIPAA and GLB's bank privacy provision is that com-
mentators do not pretend that public policy had anything to do
with the bank privacy provision.1 7
II. HIPAA SANCTIONS DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GUISE
OF PRIVACY
HIPAA rules' s only apply to health data if the patient can
be identified in the data, such as by name, social security num-
ber, or other means. 19 In other words, as long as the patient
identifier is suppressed, HIPAA allows medical data to be made
public.20 It can be blown up and put on a website, or otherwise
they're often in very fine print, customers are largely ignoring them,' said Beth
Givens, director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.").
14. Id. (noting that the privacy notices are "indecipherable").
15. Jeri Clausing, Revised Banking Legislation Raises Concerns About
Privacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1999, at C1.
16. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal
Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National
Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439 (2002) (describing
HIPAA in favorable terms).
17. The nullification of financial privacy was simply the result of raw
power being exercised by commercial lobbyists. See sources cited supra note 8;
see also Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop
Tough Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2000, at A16. Public pol-
icy had nothing to do with the law. Id.
18. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160-164 (2001).
19. See id. § 164.500 (noting that the regulations apply to "protected
health information," which is defined generally in § 164.501 as "individually
identifiable health information").
20. See id. § 164.514(a).
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published.
Even if the patient identifier is included with the health
data, HIPAA also permits the wholesale distribution of the ma-
terial under certain circumstances. For instance, health infor-
mation can be disclosed without a patient's authorization to a
third party to telemarket or direct mail "health related prod-
ucts or services" and other "products or services of nominal
value."21 Furthermore, third parties can use the information to
market any other product on a face-to-face basis.22 If the pa-
tient does not request that the marketing firm stop the com-
mercial use of this personal information during the marketing
encounter, the information may be used for additional market-
ing purposes. 23 Given the low response rate by bank depositors
to the "privacy notice" required by GLB,24 it is unlikely that
many patients will have the presence of mind during a tele-
marketing call to request that the information be suppressed.
Another instance in which HIPAA permits disclosure of pa-
tient information is when disclosure is to a federal, state or lo-
cal government agency, or a private contractor of such agency,
if the agency is authorized by law to collect data concerning
disease prevention, communicable disease, child abuse, or ad-
verse reactions to FDA regulated products.25 In Minnesota, the
Department of Health is authorized to receive such data from
health providers. 26
HIPAA also permits disclosure without patient authoriza-
tion to research projects if the disclosure is approved by an In-
stitutional Review Board (IRB).27 To approve disclosure, the
IRB must find that the research project will maintain and de-
stroy the data so that the patient harm stemming from poten-
tial disclosure is outweighed by the presumed benefit of the in-
formation's addition to the research project.28 Because IRBs
are established by research-oriented facilities, the likelihood of
patient advocacy is minimal. 29
21. Id. § 164.514(e)(2).
22. Id. § 164.514(e)(2)(A).
23. See id. § 164.514(e)(3)(i)(C).
24. Supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
25. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2001).
26. See MINN. STAT. § 62J.301 (2000).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A) (2001).
28. See id. § 164.512(i).
29. See id. § 690.107 (2001) (listing characteristics that IRBs, like the one
referenced in § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A), must possess).
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Finally, HIPAA has established limits on the information
that can be disclosed in some situations.30 Health providers
may disclose such information without patient authorization to
law enforcement officials if the disclosure is necessary to alert
such officials to the location, commission, nature or perpetrator
of a crime."
Because HIPAA permits disclosure without patient au-
thorization in the above instances, the purpose of the patient
authorization requirement becomes marginalized. In those few
instances where patient authorization is needed, HIPAA per-
mits the health care provider to refuse treatment to a patient
who does not sign an authorization form32 -the "sign or die"
provision. Most patients have an insurance or HMO contract
that requires the patient to use a "primary care provider" to re-
ceive health coverage. Because HIPAA permits disclosure
without patient authorization in several instances, and because
it permits the primary care provider to refuse treatment if au-
thorization is not given, HIPAA effectively neutralizes the pa-
tient's ability to restrict access to medical information.
III. THE GOSTIN-HODGE APPROACH TO HEALTH
PRIVACY
HIPAA undercuts the paramount value of individual
autonomy, which forms the basis of the "notice and consent"
procedures commonly used today in the medical field. Gostin
and Hodge justify HIPAA by asserting that the law should bal-
ance the need for individual anonymity with the communal in-
terest in efficiency and scientific advancement:
[WIhere the potential for public benefit is high and the risk of harm to
individuals is low,.., public entities should have discretion to use
data for important public purposes. Individuals should not be permit-
ted to veto the sharing of personal information irrespective of the po-
tential benefit to the public. 33
Gostin and Hodge argue that the patient's desire for confi-
dentiality should be subordinate to the community's interest in
projects that use medical surveillance to detect health care
fraud, to evaluate the efficacy of particular treatments or to
save money by comparing treatment utilization of specific
30. See id. § 164.512(f).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 164.506.
33. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 16, at 1441.
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health providers.
Gostin and Hodge reject the inherent importance of privacy
in our culture. Embodied in the Bill of Rights is the premise
that there is no community or government interest legitimate
enough to justify an unconsented, warrantless intrusion into
the privacy of one's home, car, body, or telephone. Laws like
HIPAA give commercial marketers access to data that our Con-
stitution deems too sensitive, absent probable cause that a
crime has been committed, to be routinely observed by the gov-
ernment. If the government can simply buy information from a
data miner, the protections of the Fourth Amendment become
marginal. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" standard is eroded if the citizen now must an-
ticipate that medical and financial records are widely accessible
to the public.
As described below,35 Gostin and Hodge also overempha-
size the need to have patient identifiers attached to medical in-
formation that is disclosed to the government, researchers, and
insurers. None of the literature supporting HIPAA's adoption
gives an adequate rationale as to why a patient's name or social
security number needs to be attached to medical information
being disseminated through the myriad of databases in gov-
ernment and commerce.
IV. THE CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF MEDICAL
PRIVACY
When speaking about medical privacy, I ask participants to
raise their hand if they have been treated for depression, drug
abuse, alcoholism, sexually transmitted diseases, sterility, erec-
tile dysfunction, yeast infections, abortion, or for mental health
problems. The participants are always healthy: Nobody ever
raises a hand. All I hear is a gasp from a crowd indignant that
I would be so impertinent as to ask them to publicly disclose
such information.
This reaction reflects a deeply imbedded value in American
culture. Privacy-and the right of the individual to embrace
dignity-is considered an essential ingredient to individual
autonomy and a free society. Stripped of privacy, the citizen is
subjected to embarrassment by neighbors, discrimination by
employers, and humiliation from friends and relatives. For in-
34. See generally id.
35. See discussion infra Part VI.
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stance, health information can be used to deny a mortgage ap-
plication, a job promotion, or an insurance policy.
The basic constitutional framework of our country is that
the government-our communal organization-has no right to
our private information, except as expressly permitted in the
Constitution. This structure reflects the underpinnings of our
culture. Thoreau,36 Huxley,37 Orwell, 38 and Rand39 represent
two centuries of a strong cultural rejection of the notion that
the community has a right to information undermining the per-
sonal dignity of the private citizen. The American contempo-
rary culture has closely embraced the issue of privacy in mov-
ies,40 websites, 41 and newspapers.42 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution rec-
ognizes a citizen's right to privacy under the Fourth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.4 This right to privacy has been
extended to issues involving marriage,44 procreation, 45 contra-
ception,46 family relationships, 47 and child rearing and educa-
tion.48 For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut49 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a marital relationship lies
within "a zone of privacy created by several fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees."50 The Court also held in Roe v. Wade5l
36. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRIGS OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1937).
37. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (HarperCollins Publishers
1998) (1932).
38. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1992) (1949).
39. See AYN RAND, ANTHEM (1946).
40. See, e.g., CONSPIRACY THEORY (Warner Bros. 1997); ENEMY OF THE
STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998); THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount Pictures
1998).
41. For example, in March 2002 the MSN search engine returned 242
websites for the term "privacy."
42. Based on research done by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, in
2001 the following publications and wire service published the following num-
ber of stories referring to the topic of privacy: The Los Angeles Times, 100; The
Washington Post, 62; The New York Times, 53; The Wall Street Journal, 49;
and The Associated Press: 252.
43. See infra notes 44-48.
44. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
45. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
47. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
48. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Id. at 485.
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that the right to privacy, either grounded in the Constitution's
concept of personal liberty or in the Ninth Amendment, in-
cludes a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.52 In-
deed, a woman who decides to have an abortion also has a right
to privacy to keep that decision from others, including her part-
ner.
53
Most states, including Minnesota, have recognized a com-
mon law right to privacy, and its principles are described in the
Restatement of Torts.5 4 As Minnesota Chief Justice Kathleen
Blatz stated,
The right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has a
public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded
and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our
lives should become public and which parts we shall hold close.
55
Many states have also adopted a statutory right to privacy.
For instance, in Minnesota there is statutory recognition of con-
fidentiality concerning tax returns, 56 cancer victims 5 7 alcohol
or drug abuse program participants5 8 welfare participants, 59
students, 60 library patrons,61 sexual assault victims, 62 agricul-
tural assistance recipients, 63 pharmacy customers,6 insurance
information, 65 and patient charts.6 6 The courts in most states
also recognize the right to privacy as it relates to communica-
tions with clergy,67 spousal partners, 68 and therapists.69
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Id. at 153.
53. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-652E (1977).
55. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998)
(Blatz, C.J.).
56. MINN. STAT. § 290.611 (2000).
57. Id. § 144.69.
58. Id. § 254A.09.
59. Id. § 13.46.
60. Id. § 13.32.
61. Id. § 13.40.
62. Id. § 13.822.
63. Id. § 13.643(2).
64. Id. § 151.213.
65. Id. § 72A.502.
66. Id. § 144.335.
67. E.g., State v. Orfi, 511 N.W.2d 464,-469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
68. E.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (discussing the Minnesota marital privilege law).
69. E.g., State v. Gullekson, 383 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(discussing the Minnesota psychologist privilege law).
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Medical information is particularly intimate and personal.
Full disclosure between a patient and physician is important to
assure that the physician receives an accurate description of a
patient's history and symptoms. If a patient knows that a phy-
sician may disclose a disease or injury, or its cause, that is hu-
miliating, embarrassing, or possibly illegal, the patient may
withhold information necessary for the physician to provide ef-
fective treatment.
Indeed, over 2500 years ago the Hippocratic Oath recog-
nized the right to patient privacy as an absolute, and not a
relative, value: "All that may come to my knowledge in the ex-
ercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily
commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I
will keep secret and will never reveal."70
American culture strongly supports the privacy of medical
information. A Harris Equifax survey regarding health infor-
mation privacy found that ninety-six percent of Americans
thought that federal legislation should designate medical in-
formation as "sensitive" and impose penalties for its disclo-
sure.7 1 Eighty-five percent of the respondents thought that
protecting the confidentiality of medical records was "abso-
lutely essential" or "very important" in health care reform.7 2
The Wisconsin Medical Association undertook a similar
survey of Wisconsin citizens concerning the release of patient-
identifying medical information to the Wisconsin Department
of Health.73 Eighty-two percent of survey respondents indi-
cated that they did not want such information disclosed either
to the government or to their employer. 4
In 1999, a Wall Street JournalNBC survey asked people
what they feared most in the coming century. The response
most often given-more than war, poverty, or the environ-
70. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799 (Maijory Spraycar ed., 26th ed.
1995) (translating the entire Hippocratic Oath); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 297 (1993) (defining the Hippocratic Oath as "an
oath that embodies a code of medical ethics and is usu[ally] taken by those
about to begin medical practice").
71. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, MEDICAL PRIVACY
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS (citing HARRIS EQUIFAX, HEALTH INFORMATION
PRIVACY SURVEY (1993)), http//www.epic.orgprivacy/medical/polls.html.
72. Id.
73. Medical Society Waging Effort to Block Implementation of Data Collec-
tion Law, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 821 (1999).
74. Id.
2002] 1489
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ment-was "the loss of privacy. ' 5
Tellingly, nearly one in five people polled by the California
Health Care Foundation stated that they withhold information
from doctors or pay cash for medical services in an, effort to
limit the hospital or doctor's ability to disclose the informa-
tion.76
V. MEDICAL DISCLOSURE CAUSES REAL HARM
There has never been a more important time to safeguard
our medical privacy. The rapid growth of marketing databases,
the regular news of accidental or purposeful disclosure of sensi-
tive health information, and the potential misuse of such in-
formation to deny credit, employment, or insurance coverage
has never been greater.
Currently, over 1000 private companies compile compre-
hensive databases about individual consumers, a tenfold in-
crease in just five years.77 On average, companies trade and
transfer personal information about U.S. citizens every five
seconds.78 These companies do not engage in the marketing of
products or the research of general demographic groups.
Rather, they simply engage in data mining, gathering as much
information as possible about each person. For example, the
Medical Marketing Service (MMS) offers lists of people with
particular medical conditions.79 In 2000, MMS offered for sale
nearly fifty lists of individuals suffering from different medical
ailments.8 ° For instance, MMS advertised for sale the names
and addresses of 700,000 people who are clinically depressed,
900,000 women who have yeast infections and 1.1 million indi-
75. THE SENATE MAJORITY TASK FORCE ON THE INVASION OF PRIVACY 12
(2000), http'//www.senate.state.ny.us/docs/nysprivO0.pdf, see also Albert R.
Hunt, Bright Past Kindles Nation's Hope, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1999, at A9
(describing the poll results).
76. Alissa J. Rubin, Lobbyists Go Full Tilt in Bid to Ease Patient Privacy
Rules, LA. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 2001, at Al.
77. Robert O'Harrow Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 1998, at Al.
78. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of
EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards,
25 YALE J. INT L. 1, 2 (2000).
79. See JOEL R. REIDENBERG, EXAMPLES OF THE SALE OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1999) (containing MMS lists given as examples to the National
Association of Attorneys General's Privacy Working Group).
80. See id.
1490 [Vol.86:1481
HIPAA: ROUND TWO
viduals who have diabetes.81 MMS also sells lists of people
with Alzheimer's disease, heartburn, Parkinson's disease, and
heart disease.82
Another data-mining company is Metromail Corporation,
which collects more than 900 different pieces of information on
individual consumers, dating back more than ten years.83 The
company was sued because it revealed personal information to
Texas prison inmates who performed data entry for the com-
pany.84 The database contained information including income,
marital status, hobbies, medical ailments, and other items such
as whether consumers used dentures, sleeping aids, or hemor-
rhoid remedies.8 5
Unauthorized disclosures or security breaches related to
electronic health records have become more frequent. In Min-
nesota, a university researcher accidentally posted the names
and psychological evaluations of children on the University of
Montana's homepage. 86 An employee of the Florida Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitation Services used a list of 4000
AIDS patients to screen potential sexual partners for himself
and his friends.87 A drug manufacturer revealed the e-mail ad-
dresses of individuals with depression, bulimia, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder.88 A congressional candidate's health re-
cords relating to her attempted suicide were faxed to a newspa-
per.89 The parents of a dead child whose kidney was donated to
another child were contacted by the parents of the recipient,
asking whether the deceased child's family had any history of
cancer.90 The parents of the child who received the organs were
able to request the information because a university errone-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Nina Bernstein, Personal Files Via Computer Offer Money and Pose
Threat, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1997, at Al.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Maura Lerner & Josephine Marcotty, Web Posting Has Health and
University Officials Scrambling, STAR TRIB., Nov. 8, 2001, at Bi.
87. Sarah Tippit, AIDS List Leak Causes Concern Over Security of Health
Records, CI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at 22.
88. Robert OHarrow Jr., Prozac Maker Reveals Patient E-Mail Addresses,
WASH. POST, July 4,2001, at El.
89. AmITAI ETZIONI, THE LInTS OF PRIVACY 141 (1999); CHARLES J.
SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 106 (1999).
90. Telephone Interview with Kidney Donor's Parents (2001) (on file with
author).
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ously included anonymous donor names in a mass mailing.91
VI. THE ILLUSORY COMMUNAL INTEREST IN PATIENT
IDENTIFIERS
HIPAA not only marginalizes the value of privacy, it over-
states the necessity of attaching patient identifiers to medical
information. Our culture has no objection to the transfer of
medical charts with a redacted patient's name, social security
number, or other identifier to track the response and progres-
sion of treatment for sexually transmitted disease, depression,
chemical dependency, hemorrhoids, yeast infections, erectile
dysfmnction, or any other disease that might be the subject of
ridicule or discrimination. One presumes that high tech data
analyses can effectively process and measure the treatments
and side effects without use of patient identifiers. For instance,
the use of an identifier for each health provider, and a numeric
subset code to be used for each patient of a provider, would
seemingly be helpful to categorize each patient being treated.
The premise of HIPAA, however, is that such medical in-
formation is not enough. HIPAA presumes that patient identi-
fiers must also be attached to medical records to conduct valid
research. Researchers I have interviewed indicate that the
primary research purpose of attaching the patient identifiers is
to follow a patient if he transfers from one provider to the next.
Yet researchers have failed to provide examples of situations
where such patient identifier information was found to mean-
ingfully expedite conclusions concerning the efficacy of a par-
ticular treatment. There are simply too many other personal
variables missing on general medical charts that impede the
value of such close tracking of a patient. In other words, while
a macro analysis of the efficacy of treatments of the United
States population might reveal certain trends, it cannot answer
with certainty whether other factors not recorded on a medical
chart affect the treatment outcome. Accordingly, the use of a
patient identifier to track a patient from one physician to the
next is hardly necessary if only a general trend can be ascer-
tained.
HIPAA also permits a government agency, and companies
that contract with a government agency, to receive patient
identifying health data without the patient's consent. HIPAA
91. Josephine Marcotty, Names of Donors Are Accidentally Included in
Letter to Kidney Patients, STAR TRIB., Jan. 15, 2002, at Al.
1492 [Vol.86:1481
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allows government agencies to collect and share such informa-
tion in a variety of ill-defined categories, such as any use "re-
quired by law,"92 "public health activities,"93 or "health over-
sight."94 Yet, at no time do the proponents of HIPAA articulate
the communal interest in using the patient's name to assemble
and track such information. If the government accumulation of
private health data pursuant to these categories is for medical
research purposes, then the exception for government-
sponsored medical research is nullified. If it is to assist the in-
vestigation and prosecution of criminal activity, then the excep-
tion for law enforcement purposes is unnecessary. If it is to
monitor and evaluate the efficacy of treatment by health pro-
viders, the need for an identifier of the health provider, not the
patient, should be sufficient. Rather than attempting to ex-
plain the value of, or need for, this communal interest, Gostin
and Hodge cavalierly presume that the government has a
"right" to access such information. This presumption contra-
dicts the cultural value of privacy as expressed in the Constitu-
tion and in 200 years of common law.
Indeed, any attempt to justify HIPAA's disclosure rules as
reflecting a balance of communal interest versus individual
rights is undermined and laid bare by the rules that permit
telemarketers to obtain private health data for marketing and
fundraising purposes. Proponents of such rules should blush
when they attempt to justify such activity on the basis of a
"communal interest."
HIPAA proponents attempt to dress up their capitulation
to commercial interests by concocting a communal interest, or a
"governmental right to know," concerning health data. In fact,
rules that permit disclosure of health data for purposes of tele-
marketing, fundraising, government snooping, and medical re-
search can only be explained by looking to the many lobbyists
and commercial interests that have a financial stake in obtain-
ing such information. HIPAA should be recognized for what it
is: a national policy promulgated by unelected government offi-
cials who succumbed to the interests of commercial enterprise
and marginalized the citizen's right to privacy. The proponents
of HIPAA represent a closely connected liaison of government
agencies, pharmaceutical companies, law enforcement agencies,
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2001).
93. Id. § 164.512(b).
94. Id. § 164.512(d)(1).
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medical device manufacturers, and marketing companies.
Their success in getting HIPAA adopted shows that their clout
rivals that of the military industrial complex at the height of
the Cold War.
CONCLUSION
Personal autonomy and liberty are the essence of privacy.
Whether recognized in the Constitution, common law, or stat-
ute, the right to privacy empowers individuals to define, and
redefine, who they are. This liberty interest recognizes that
misuse of private information invades a person's privacy and
may cause harm "far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury."95
Two of the most important tools to preserve personal pri-
vacy are the right to receive notice concerning the disclosure of
personal information and the right to withhold consent before
such disclosure. HIPAA eviscerates the requirement that re-
searchers or government agencies justify the disclosure of per-
sonal health information. It abandons any attempt to look for
less intrusive methods to conduct such activities. By weaken-
ing notice and consent, the Gostin-Hodge approach marginal-
izes the value of personal autonomy and liberty.
The Gostin-Hodge approach also fails to address issues
created by cross-industry ownership, such as a bank's owner-
ship of an insurance company or an employer's sponsorship of a
self-insured health plan. While such entities may have been
separate twenty or thirty years ago, fewer boundaries now exist
among banks, brokerages, pharmaceutical companies, hospi-
tals, and insurers. This lack of industry segmentation in-
creases the opportunity for personal health information to be
misused, and further justifies the need to obtain express con-
sent before health or medical information is disclosed.
Privacy is not only "the right to be let alone,"96 but the
right to define who we are as people by controlling the release
of our private information. Today, this right to privacy or self-
definition is increasingly threatened by advances in technology
and the growing financial value of personal information. If we
wish to truly protect our liberty interests consistent with deep-
rooted public expectations for privacy, policymakers must
95. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
96. Id. at 195.
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tighten the current HIPAA regulations and limit their excep-
tions. Only when the balance tips in favor of greater individual
control do we fairly protect our liberty to choose "whether that
which is [ours] shall be given to the public."97
97. Id. at 199.
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